of humanistic idealism and argue that the most valid and ethicopolitically pertinent dimension of the critique of humanism is that which points to humanism's possible role in an anthropocentric perspective that, at least surreptitiously or unintentionally, validates whatever serves human interests and, as a consequence, projectively situates other animals, or animality in general (including the animal in the human being), in the position of bare life, raw material, or scapegoated victim. In fact the human/animal divide is often premised on a dubious comparison between an idealized, rights-bearing, "normal" human-usually a healthy adult in full possession of his or her faculties-and an excessively homogeneous category of the animal.
2 The obvious question is whether these mutually reinforcing frames of reference provide a sufficient basis for the understanding of problems or the elaboration of viable alternatives.
3 A related issue is whether the concept of human rights should be replaced, or at least supplemented, by that of claims that are so basic or fundamental that they are situated beyond sovereignty and should not be infringed by supposedly sovereign states (or other entities). Indeed legitimate claims that limit human assertiveness would place the concept of sovereignty in doubt and apply in important respects to other animals or even ecological systems. [ . . . ] A question concerning humanism is whether it has always required a radical other, perhaps even a quasi-sacrificial victim and scapegoat, in the form of some excluded or denigrated category of beings, often other animals or animality itself. As categories of humans (such as women or nonwhite "races") have been critically disclosed as the encrypted other of humanism, however universalistic in its pretensions, the other-than-human animal in its animality has been left as the residual repository of projective alienation or radical otherness. Indeed forms of posthumanism may still divorce the human from the animal and anthropocentrically seek the differential criterion (or essence) identifying the human, even when that criterion paradoxically points to an enigma or indistinction: a traumatic split, signifying stress, or anxiety-ridden form of selfquestioning that serves to set apart the human or its "post" avatars such as Dasein or creaturely life. 4 One especially dubious function or consequence of a decisive divide between humans and other animals is to situate the latter in a separate sphere that makes them available for narrowly anthropocentric uses and even exposes them to victimization as if they were simply beyond the pale of ethical and political concerns. At best, actions, including violent actions, against other animals are subject to much lesser legal sanctions than comparable actions performed against humans.
5 Paradoxically, the projection of other animals into a separate sphere may take two seemingly contradictory but at times conjoined forms: the reduction of the other to infra-ethical status, for example, as raw material, purely instrumental being, or mere life, and the elevation of the other to a supra-ethical status as sacrificial or quasi-sacrificial victim as well as utterly opaque or enigmatic other (whether within or outside the self ). One may also foreclose the issue of denigration or victimization of other animals as an ethical and political problem by restricting one's concern to humans and leaving other animals out of the equation or at best referring to them only or predominantly in anthropocentric ways, including their reduction to a form of radical alterity. Here anthropocentrism may serve invidious functions insofar as it ascribes certain abilities or considerations only to humans and induces an excessive generalization of the category of anthropomorphism, typically on the unexamined assumption that one has an unproblematic, clear-cut idea of what is distinctively human and that there is indeed a decisive criterion that divides the human from other animals or perhaps the human from animality in the human being. (The charge of anthropomorphism may even serve as a screen for anthropocentrism. 6 ) A decisive difference between humans and other animals may, in certain contexts, also be linked to the postulation of decisive differences between categories of humans based on gender, sexual orientation, race, and class. Traditionally women were seen as closer to nature and to other animals, for example, with respect to menstrual cycles. They have also been seen as dominated by
